Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Sham Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule in Welfare Trust Fund Agreement by Price, John M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 6 
1962 
Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Sham Exception to 
the Parol Evidence Rule in Welfare Trust Fund Agreement 
John M. Price 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John M. Price, Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Sham Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule in 
Welfare Trust Fund Agreement, 60 MICH. L. REV. 810 (1962). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss6/9 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS-SHAM EXCEPTION 
TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN WELFARE TRUST FUND AGREEMENTS-
Defendant, shortly after commencing a small-scale strip-mining operation, 
signed a standard United Mine Workers collective bargaining agreement. 
He claimed that before signing he informed the union representative that 
he could not pay the union wage scale, or the specified royalty payments 
to the plaintiffs, trustees of the union welfare and retirement fund, and 
that he signed only after being assured that the agreement was a mere 
formality. Defendant did not pay union wages, and sent monthly checks 
to the plaintiffs only in amounts he felt he could afford. Plaintiffs brought 
suit on the written agreement for payment of the royalties on coal mined 
by the defendant and were awarded a summary judgment. On appeal, 
held, reversed and remanded, one judge dissenting.1 The facts were not 
sufficiently established to determine whether or not the parol evidence 
rule should be invoked; but if the defendant can show that the signed 
contract was not the real agreement between himself and the union, he 
1 The dissenting judge gave three reasons why the defendant failed to state an 
adequate defense: (1) trust fund agreements are required to be in writing; (2) there 
should be no sham exception to the parol evidence rule in suits brought on collective 
bargaining agreements; and (3) even if the defendant could rely on an oral agreement 
in a suit by the union, he cannot assert it as a defense against trustees. Principal case 
at 200. 
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should not be held liable on the written terms. Lewis v. Lowry, 295 F.2d 
197 (4th Cir. 1961). 
Ever since the Supreme Court decision in Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills,2 there has existed a question regarding the extent to which 
the federal courts would develop rules specially adapted to the collective 
bargaining contract rather than applying ordinary commercial contract 
law in suits brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act.3 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court have focused on the 
unique requirements of the federal labor policy and indicate a trend away 
from the use of traditional contract doctrines. The Court's decisions in 
the three Steelworkers cases;1 which greatly broadened the jurisdiction of 
the labor arbitrator, emphasized the fact that a collective bargaining agree-
ment is "more than a contract."5 The labor agreement was characterized 
as a "generalized code"6 entered into by the parties in an "effort to erect 
a system of industrial self-govemment."7 Another example is Lewis v. 
Benedict Coal Co.,8 where the Court affirmed a Sixth Circuit decision 
which held that the commercial -contract rule concerning set-off in a third 
party beneficiary situation was inapplicable in a suit brought by trustees 
of a welfare fund.9 The affirming members of the Court found that the 
LMRA,10 by requiring the employer and the union to share the responsi-
bility for the management of the welfare fund, had created an atypical 
community of interest between the promisor and the third party bene-
ficiary. Looking upon royalty payments as merely another form of com-
pensation to the employees, the affirming members of the Court hinted 
that an employer's obligation to pay "might be thought to be incorporated 
into the individual employee contracts."11 The dissenting members agreed 
that in construing a collective bargaining agreement the national labor 
policy must be taken into account. But they felt that the affirming jus-
tices had unnecessarily narrowed the scope and applicability of conven-
tional contract principles.12 The criticism voiced by the dissent in the 
Benedict case has been reiterated by some of the leading writers in the 
field, who feel that some standard contract rules are quite pertinent in a 
2 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
3 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958). 
4 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
ll United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., supra note 4, at 578. 
6 Ibid. 
1 Id. at 580. 
8 361 U.S. 458 (1960), affirming 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958). 
o This was the same fund as the one involved in the principal case. 
10 LMRA § 302(c)(5)(B), 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1958). 
11 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Co., 361 U.S. 459, 469 (1960). 
12 Id. at 475 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting). 
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labor environment and that it would be foolish to condemn conventional 
doctrines, time-tested and sound, merely because they traditionally have 
been used in a somewhat different context.13 
' The lower federal courts have recently decided a number of cases 
brought by trustees seeking enforcement of trust fund payments. In most 
of the cases-including the principal case-where small-scale operators 
have attempted to escape payment by claiming to have entered into oral 
agreements prior to signing the trust fund agreement, the courts have 
reached their decisions by using common-law rules.14 But they generally 
have been unwilling to characterize the writing as sham, void from its in-
ception, and have often followed the lead of the district court in Lewis v. 
Mearns15 in dismissing the mine owners' defenses.16 In the Mearns case 
tihe court held that even if a fraud had been perpetrated on the employer 
in procuring a written agreement, the agreement was voidable rather than 
void under West Virginia law, and the employer's acts17 represented rati-
fication and acceptance of the contract. However, the decision in Mearns 
recognizes but one of two opposing common-law views. A majority of 
state courts recognize the sham exception to the parol evidence rule and 
would allow a party to a commercial contract to show a prior oral agree-
ment rendering the written contract void.18 The court in the principal 
case approved the use of this latter rule in a labor context. Assuming that 
a commercial contract rule is applicable in the situation presented by 
these trust fund cases, the objective of national uniformity in the dispo-
sition of cases brought under section 301 is hardly advanced by determin-
ing each case on the basis of the rule of the particular jurisdiction. 
13 See, e.g., Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. 
L. REv. 1 (1958); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 
28 U. Cm. L. REV. 464, 480 (1961). 
14 At common law, all oral agreements prior to or contemporaneous with a valid 
contract are inadmissible in evidence. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 237 (1932). But a 
party to the contract is allowed to prove facts rendering the agreement void or voidable. 
Id. § 238(b). In most instances the agreement will be declared void if the parties, at 
the time of signing, avow that they are not signing a binding contract. 3 CORBIN, CON• 
TRACTS § 577, at 385 (2d ed. 1960). A third party beneficiary to a contract takes an 
interest which is subject to the same limitations. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 140 (1932). 
But a sham contract which is relied upon in good faith by the beneficiary to his detri-
ment may become enforceable against the promisor by estoppel. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 
§ 1473, at 872 (2d ed. 1960). 
15 168 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.W. Va. 1958), afj'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1959). 
16 E.g., Lewis v. Gilchrist, 198 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Lewis v. Young&: Perkins 
Coal Co., 190 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Ky. 1960). But see Lewis v. Mears, 189 F. Supp. 503 
(W.D. Pa. 1960), afj'd per curiam, 297 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1961). 
17 The court in the Mearns case held that defendant's failure to deny liability under 
the trust fund clause, the fact that he filled out UMW grievance forms for two employees 
he had discharged as provided in the written contract, and the fact that he checked 
off union dues for his employees were all acts which indicated that he thought he 
was operating under a written contract. 
18 See note 14 supra. 
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Although the tendency has been to treat allegedly sham trust fund 
agreements as equivalent to commercial contracts, any rule to be applied 
in construing a labor agreement must be analyzed in light of the national 
labor policy. The dissenting opinion in the principal case presents a 
summation of arguments for according special treatment to a trust fund 
agreement made in a collective bargaining context. First, reference is made 
to the statement in the Benedict case that royalty payments are an indi-
rect form of compensation, and the argument is made that employees 
have a right to know exactly what they are receiving and how well the 
union has represented them. This argument evidently assumes not only 
that a signed contract is the one way employees have of determining the 
outcome of negotiations,19 but, more importantly, that there is some sort 
of detrimental reliance by the employees on the terms of a signed agree-
ment. As a generality the tacit assumptions in this argument are probably 
true. But in the employment situations found in a majority of those 
cases brought under the UMW trust fund clause, it is at least questionable 
whether there was any employee reliance on the terms of the agreement.20 
In the principal case, for instance, the mine owner did not even pay his 
employees the wages required by the national agreement. Secondly, the 
Benedict case is cited for the proposition that the trustees' rights under 
the agreement are not dependent upon the rights of the union; that is, 
although the employer might have an adequate defense against claims 
made by the union, his obligation to pay royalties to the trustees cannot be 
diminished by an oral agreement made with the union's agent. It is sub-
mitted that this interpretation of Benedict is much too broad. That case 
decided only where to attach liability for injuries caused by the union, and 
the decision was based on federal policy which is arguably inapplicable in 
determining whether there is a contract at all on which trustees can rest 
an action.21 Finally, reference is made to the Steelworkers cases and the 
characterization in those decisions of the collective bargaining agreement as 
rn The LMRA itself evidences the importance Congress has attached to the signed 
agreement. Section 302 of the act, in attempting to safeguard the interests of trust 
fund beneficiaries from possible mismanagement by union officials, requires a written 
agreement, signed by the employer, setting out the terms of the trust fund payments. 
Further, the written agreement has long been recognized as a significant step in the 
good faith bargaining process, and the LMRA, in defining the duty to bargain col-
lectively, emphasizes the importance of such an agreement in attaining the act's objec-
tive of industrial peace. NLRA § 8(d), added by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) 
(1958). See generally Fcinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bar-
gaining, 57 MICH. L. R.Ev. 807, 812 (1959). 
20 These cases also suggest an inquiry into a union's fiduciary duty to its members 
in the collective bargaining context. 
21 The Court cited as controlling § 30l(b) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 
U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958), which states that "any money judgment against a labor organization 
in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against its assets, and 
shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets." (Emphasis added.) 
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an industrial constitution. But the governmental nature of the agreement 
comes from its broad coverage of the relationships of a large number of 
people.22 In the principal case, and in a majority of the other cases decided 
in this area, the defendant mine owner employed only a very small number 
of men, and questions affecting working conditions were capable of being 
settled on the scene. The analogy to a constitution seems to break down 
when contracts cover sucl:J. small-scale operations and the practicalities of the 
situation require something much less than the administrative tools pro-
vided in the standard bargaining agreements. 
The federal judiciary has not yet given adequate consideration to the 
unique problem presented by cases, such as the principal case, involving 
mine operators who employ small numbers of people. It is submitted that 
in such cases the common-law exception to the parol evidence rule should 
be made available to defendant employers. This is not to say that an oral 
agreement between an employer and a union agent will in every instance 
be a defense to a claim brought under the written agreement. The national 
labor policy requires the special protection of employees covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement, and employees who actually rely on the 
benefits due them under a trust fund clause should be allowed to recover 
those benefits. Indeed, in most instances employees will work in reliance 
on the terms of the written agreement, and there should be a presumption 
of such reliance in all cases. But in those cases where the employer can 
show that there has been no employee reliance on the terms of the trust 
fund clause, he should be allowed also to show that the writing was not 
the actual agreement between himself and the union. Certainly the LMRA 
must be construed to contemplate the written agreement representing 
the end product of the good faith collective bargaining process to be the 
actual agreement of the bargaining parties.23 But to place a stamp of 
approval on all written agreements, without allowing an inquiry into the 
reasons for their formation or the reliance made on them by the interested 
parties, seems not only to work an injustice on employers but to misinter-
pret the national labor policy. 
John M. Price 
22 See Cox, supra note 13, at 22. 
2s The problems discu~d herein might fruitfully be considered in the light of the 
implications of the "good faith" bargaining obligation. 
